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ABSTRACT
Windfall profits and losses accrue to investors only when expected
after—tax returns or discount rates change, and major tax policy shiftsare
likely to alter these variables. This study introduces a cashflow valuation
model for estimating the windfalls to owners of U.S. nonfinancialcorporations
caused by the enactment of tax changes. The model is illustrated byanalysis
of two reform packages, the Treasury Proposal of November 1984 and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
We find that the original Treasury plan would have boosted stock prices
by 20 to 30 percent; an increase of 10 to 12 percent is computed for the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. This anomalous result ——a$125 to $140 billion dollar
corporate tax increase (over five years) raising stock prices ——occursbecause
the tax increase is on new capital, not old capital. The stock marketlargely
values expected returns on the existing capital stock, and these returns
benefit from the adverse treatment of new investment.
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Windfall profits and losses accrue to investors only whenexpected
after—tax returns or discount rates change, and major taxpolicy shifts are
likely to alter these variables. This study introduces a cashflow valuation
model for estimating the windfalls to owners of U.S. nonfinancialcorporations
caused by the enactment of tax changes. The model is illustratedby analysis
of two reform packages, the Treasury Proposal of November 1984and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
The valuation model, introduced in Section 1, calculates fundamental
value of equity as the discounted sum of the expected residualcashf low stream.
This stream depends on tax parameters and the rentalprice of capital, and the
resultant fundamental value will, in an efficient capitalmarket, determine
(equal) the level of stock prices. In Section 2 we compute fundamentalequity
value for the nonfinancial corporate sector at the end of 1984.We then
recompute, in Section 3, value using the tax parameters and rental prices
contained in or derived from the tax reforms. The shareholder's windfall
profit or loss ——theanticipated change in the stock prices ——equalsthe
change in fundamental equity value.
We find that the original Treasury plan would have boosted stockprices
by 20 to 30 percent; an increase of 10 to 12 percent is computed for theTax
Reform Act of 1986. This anomalous result ——a$125 to $140 billion dollar
corporate tax increase (over five years) raising stock prices ——occursbecause
the tax increase is on new capital, not old capital. The stockmarket largely
values expected returns on the existing capital stock, and thesereturns
benefit from the adverse treatment of new investment.11. Determining Fundamental Equity Value
Gross cashflows received by a firm represent reimbursement for its
operating and financial production costs. In principle, gross cashflows are
distributed among the different factors of production in proportion to the
share of the factor's contribution to the final product. Some of the cashflows
go to labor, some to raw material suppliers, and other cashf lows go to pay
interest and taxes. The residual goes to equity, and the present value of the
expected residual cashflows is the fundamental value of equity. In efficient
markets, the firm's stock value is an unbiased estimate of the fundamental
value.
Let Rt be the residual cashflow that factor j is expected to produce at
time s+t, where that expectation is formed at time s based upon all available




where e is the nominal required return on equity. Computing the total equity
value of the firm as the sum of V across all j requires specification both of
the residual cashf low stream expected from all factors of production and the
equity rate.
Almost by definition, only capital is a store of value and so only
capital generates residual cashflows. Suppliers of variable factor inputs such
as labor and energy, are reimbursed an amount just equal to the value of their
productive services and therefore these factors do not pass any cashflows
through to shareholders. Residual cashflows are produced by all the firm's
capital: current assets, fixed assets, land and intangibles. Given the short—3—
lives of existing current assets (e.g., inventories and trade credit), their
residual cashflows are largely invarient to tax policy changes and thus will
not deliver significant windfalls.
Say fixed asset type j is expected to produce earnings before
depreciation, interest, and taxes equal to NOI, tax depreciation deductions
equal to TAXD, and interest and principal costs associated with debt financing
equal to INT and DEBT. The residual cashflow is
Rt =(l—t)NOI+ TTAXD —(l—r)INT+ DEBT, (2)
where T is the corporate profits tax rate.
The sum of fundamental equity (Va) and debt (D) valuesequals the
discounted sum of the NOl and TAXD streams, where the discount rate isthe
weighted average cost of debt and equity financing, r (Modigliani andMiller,
1963). This sum, denoted by W, is fixed asset type j's total fundamental
value and is computed as
W =V+ D
S S 5
=t=s(l) [(lt)NQI + tTAXD}. (3)
Given that debt is a constant fraction, b, of firm wealth, the
fundamental value of shareholder claims against fixed assettype j can be
estimated directly from the NOl and TAXD streams as
V= (l—b)W S S
=(1_b)t(l+r) t—S)[(l)NoIj + TTAXD). (4)
Notice that NOIt and TAXDt are expectations about time s+t cashflows and
are formed at time s using all available information. These cashf lowsare
attributable both to assets in place at time s surviving until times+t and to—4-.
investments made between time s and s+t, net of the incremental acquisition
costs of these future investments. Brainard, Shoven, and Weiss (1980) compute
alternative estimates of fundamental value over the 1968—1977 sample period,
one of which includes the net present value of growth opportunities (the value
of intangible capital) and another that does not. The estimate including
growth opportunities is a stable 1.5 percent larger than the estimate which
assumes future investments have zero net present value. Thus, even if an
anti—investment tax reform were to eliminate growth opportunities completely,
the market value of equities would decline by only 1.5 percent. In light of
this small difference, we model future investments as zero net present value
ventures.
Every dollar of type j capital provides NOI equal to the rental price of
capital, c. Thus, the NOI expected at time s to be produced at time s+t is
NOI =cK_1,
(5)
where is the capital stock replacement cost of asset type j.2 Following
Hall and Jorgenson (1967), the rental price is computed as
c (r+—ii) (l—v—TZ)/(l—T) , (6)
where it is the expected inflation rate, is the economic depreciation rate,
v3 is the effective rate of the investment tax credit, and Z is the present
value of tax depreciation deductions on a one dollar investment in asset type
3.
The replacement cost that time s capital is expected to have at s+t is
K =(l_J+it)tKJ, t 0
where K is the replacement cost of the capital stock at time s. K is
computed as
K =q1[L(l_oi)uIRi J. osul s—u—5—
The term in brackets is the real capital stock at time s, and qJ is thesupply
price of new capital goods. IR is real investment in capital typej, and L is
the capital's productive service life.
Future tax deductions promised by the existing stock, TAXD, are
predetermined by historic investment flows and the tax depreciation laws in
effect at the time the capital was put in place. LetZs,u be the percent of
the gross nominal investment which, given the tax laws in effect at time s,
is deducted u years after acquisition. The tax depreciation deduction that the
time s capital stock promises at time s+t is
TAXD =L z . (7) tu=t s+t—u 5+t—u,u
Fundamental equity value may be estimated by substituting the expressions for
TAXD and NOl into equation 43
The discount rate r is the weighted average after—tax cost of debt and
equity financing:
r =b(l—T)±+(l—b)e, (8)
where a portfolio equilibrium can be used to infer the equity rate from
interest and tax rates. With equity returns taxed at the rateT, the after—
tax return to shareholders is
(l—i )e =R+p, (9) e m e
where Rm is the yield on risk—free tax—exempt securities and'e is the risk
premium required on investment in corporate equity. The tax exempt rate, in
turn, can be related to the taxable interest rate and corporate and personal
tax rates via a Miller equilibrium (1977).—6—
2. Fundamental Value Estimates
Generating our estimate of V(P&E) requires that we model the NOl and TAXD
streams for plant and equipment as specified in equations 5 and 7. The length
of the cashf low streams for plant and equipment equals the productive life of
the capital assets, which we assume to be 50 and 20 years, respectively. The
empirical results are not sensitive to the asset life selected because the bulk
of all discounted returns are received during the early years; over 95 percent
are received within 9 years for equipment and 19 years for plant. Although we
estimate separate streams for plant and equipment, the discussion below usually
refers to the sum of the two series or, where appropriate, their weighted
average.
The NOl stream depends upon the productive size of the asset base
generating the revenues. Column 1 of Table 1 lists the proportion of the 1984
real capital stock surviving into the future. By the ninth year, 1993, the
surviving stock is capable of producing only half of its original product.
After the twentieth year, the stock of equipment is totally expired, and after
the twenty—fifth year, 2009, all but 17 percent of the 1984 real stock of plant
and equipment has expired.4 Discounted cashf lows beyond 2009 (not shown)
account for less than one percent of the existing capital's fundamental value.
The NOl equals the product of the replacement cost, listed in column 2,
and the rental price. Over time, inflation exerts an upward force on NOI5,
tending to offset the decline induced by losses in productive capacity. A
dollar of equipment generates $0.2261 of NOl, the rental price of equipment,
whereas a dollar of plant generates $0.15l0 of NOl, the rental price of plant.5
Column 3 lists the NOI stream.
More than half of the NOIs during the first five years of the return
stream are free from taxation because of the shield provided by depreciation
deductions. We depreciate historic investments with the tax depreciation—7—
practices in effect at their time of acquisition (as specified inequation 7).
Tax lives from the U.S. Federal Reserve BoardQuarterly Econometric Model
(FRBQM, 1983) are used to obtain estimates of the tax shield thatassets
existing at year—end 1984 were expected to provide over theirremaining lives.
Half of all equipment investments prior to 1981are depreciated by sum—
of—year's digits and half by double declining balance withan optimal switch to
straight line. In and after 1981, ninety—five percent ofequipment investments
are depreciated in the 5—year ACRS class and fivepercent in the 3—year class.
For plant investments prior to 1981, we employ theFRBQM weight "proportion of
structure's investment depreciated by accelerated methods"and depreciate half
of those by sum—of—year's digits and halfby one—hundred fifty percent
declining balance with the optimal switch to straight line. Theplant
investments not depreciated by accelerated methodsare depreciated by straight
line.
The stream of tax depreciation deductionspromised by the 1984 existing
stock is listed in column 4 of Table 1. The mostremote deductions promised by
the existing stock are scheduled to be taken in 2021and accrue from plant
investment made in 1980. Investments after 1980are depreciated more quickly
owing to the introduction of ACRS. The sumofall deductions is $1423 billion,
which is about two—thirds the capital stock'scurrent replacement cost of $2145
billion. Total deductions are less thanreplacement cost because tax lives are
less than service lives and because tax deductionsare based on historic prices
instead of current prices. The present value of theexpected depreciation
deductions stream is $752 billion or thirty—fivecents per dollar of vintage
capital, substantially less than the sixty—three cents ofdiscounted
depreciation deductions offered by a dollar of newcapital (the Z term used in
our rental price).—8—
In constructing r, we give the after—tax debt rate a weight of one—third
and the equity rate a weight of two—thirds. For our prereform values, we set
the pre—tax debt rate equal to 0.10 and the equity rate to 0.1542 (see
Hendershott, 1986). Our corporate tax rate is 0.4924 (a marginal federal tax
of 0.46 plus a federally—deductible state and local tax rate of 0.06). The
resulting weighted average cost of capital is 0.120, and the estimate of
W(P&E), the market value of debt and equity claims against nonfinancial
corporate plant and equipment, is $1596 billion. The value of equity, V(P&E),
is two—thirds times that or $1064 billion.
3. The Effects of Tax Reform
To illustrate our model, impacts on stock values are computed for the
original Treasury proposal and the Tax Reform Act of 1986.6 The key parameters
relevant for both current law and the alternative reforms are listed in Table
2. Both proposals lower the corporate tax rate, remove the investment tax
credit, generally lengthen tax depreciation schedules and remove the capital
gains exclusion which increases the personal tax rate on equity. The Treasury
plan also includes substantial inflation indexation (capital gains,
depreciation base, and interest income and expense) and provides a deduction
for half of dividends paid out. We have modeled only the general tax changes
contained in the reforms. The reforms also include a number of industry
specific changes that are almost uniformly negative. To the extent that these
affect new investments, rental prices, and thus equity values, will rise; to
the extent the changes impact existing capital stock, equity values will fall.
Our results are reported in three parts. The first reflects the impact
of the statutory changes holding rental prices and the level of taxable
interest rates constant. These results would hold if (1) investment adjustment
costs were prohibitively large (and thus no changes in business investment and—9—
NOIs on vintage capital occurred) and (2) internationalcapital flows and world
saving were infinitely elastic (and thus taxable debt rates were fixed).The
second part allows rental prices to change; in theextreme, investment costs
are assumed to be zero and the NOIs on vintage capital areinstantaneously
shifted in line with the new equilibrium rental prices.7 The thirdpart
explores the effect of macroeconomic influences on taxable interest rates and
stock prices.8 All reforms substantially reduceaggregate investment demand
and raise the after—tax returns to savers (both at prereform interestrate
levels) .Interestrates would thus be expected to decline.
Constant Corporate Fixed Investment and Taxable Debt Rates
The first set of calculations in Table 3 (rows 1—3)reports the change in
fundamental equity value, and thus stock prices, assumingno change in
corporate fixed investment (and thus the NOIs) or in taxable debt rates. Row I
simulates the impact of a cut in the corporate tax rate andan increase in the
taxation of equity at the personal level. While the cut in thecorporate tax
rate leads directly to an increase in after—tax NOIs, the tax ratechanges also
raise the tax exempt rate (given a fixed taxable rate) and thus theequity
rate. More specifically, the equity rate increases by 170 basispoints with
the Treasury plan and 141 basis points with the 1986 Act. Thenet result is a
minor 3% windfall gain to equity with either plan.
The Treasury proposal changes the rules regarding thedeductibility of
financing costs: corporations are allowed to deduct 50% of dividends from
their pre—tax profit, and the proportion of interest thatmay be deducted is
indexed to the inflation rate. The weightedaverage after—tax cost of
financing becomes
r =b(1—t)i+(1—b)(l—Ty)e,
where 8 and y are the proportions of interest and dividends deductiblefrom the
tax base.—10—
As listed in Table 3 under the Treasury proposal, fundamental equity
value rises from $1069 billion to $1162 (row 1) billion because of the tax rate
reductions, and it rises to $1391 billion (row 2) because of the 50% dividend
exclusion. With the interest indexation provision, both the debt and equity
components of the cost of financing rise, the equity component because of the
reduced tax wedge in the tax—exempt rate vis—a—vis the still—constant taxable
debt rate i. The net result of the higher discount rate is a halving of the
increase in fundamental equity value stemming from the other provisions (row
3)
Variable Corporate Fixed Investment, Constant Taxable Debt Rate
The marginal rental prices rise so modestly in response to the tax rate
changes in each proposal that the impact on stock values when these prices are
endogenous (row 4) is virtually identical to when they are exogenous (row 1)
On the other hand, the deceleration of depreciation schedules on new
investments, the removal of the investment tax credit, and the only partial
deduction of interest sharply raise rental prices for both plant and equipment,
although the partial deductibility of dividends mitigates the impact of the
Treasury proposal. With the Treasury proposal, rental prices rise to 0.2941
for equipment (from 0.2261) and 0.1859 for plant (from 0.1510) .Withthe 1986
Tax Act, the increases are to 0.2649 and 0.1651, respectively. With the NOIs
adjusting with these values, stock prices rise by 13% with the 1986 Act and 30%
with the Treasury proposal.
Variable Corporate Fixed Investment, Constant Aggregate Investment
As noted, both reforms tend to lower interest rates. The interest
indexation feature of the Treasury plan is the most obvious source of lower
rates. With only partial taxation of interest income and deductibility of
interest expense, both the supply—of and demand—for funds schedules shift—11—
downward. The 1986 Tax Act, too, will lower both schedules: removal ofthe
investment tax credit and lengthening of depreciation tax lives lower the
demand—for—funds schedule, and the cut in personal tax rates lowers thesupply
schedule. To illustrate the impact of a decrease in the level of interest
rates, we employ an estimate of how much the level would have to decline to
maintain the level of aggregate investment (noncorporate, includingowner—
occupied housing, as well as corporate) constant at prereform values
(Hendershott, 1986). The lower interest rate levels and the equity rate
associated with them are listed in Table 2. The taxable debt rate is foundto
decline by 1.4 percentage points with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and 2.6points
with the Treasury plan.
The reduction in required financing rates reduces thediscounting effect
and thus increases fundamental equity value. Row 6 of Table 3 allows all
parameters, including the taxable interest rate, to reflect their post—reform
values, except for the rental prices which are held constant. Rentalprices
would be constant if investment adjustment costs were largeenough to prevent
any change in investment outlays. The net result is a 23 percent windfall gain
to equity from the Treasury proposal and a 10 percent gain with theenacted
legislation. A comparison of rows 3 and 6 shows that the interest rate
reduction has a substantial positive impact on equity value.
In row 7 the rental prices are allowed to adjust to reflect all features
of the tax reforms, as would happen in the absence ofadjustment costs. These
adjustments have a marginally positive impact on fundamental equity value, with
the Treasury plan providing shareholders with a 26percent windfall and the Tax
Reform Act a 12 percent gain.—12—
4. Conclusion
In the past decade, shifts in tax policy have produced significant
windfall gains and losses. This study has introduced a cashf low model for
computing windfalls accruing to equity shareholders. Predictions about
windfalls enable policymakers to better analyze the distributional impacts of
their actions and allow investors to better appreciate their exposure to
unexpected policy changes.
Our model was applied to both the original Treasury tax reform proposal
and the enacted Tax Reform Act of 1986. Both of these would cut the corporate
tax rate, the latter a little less than the former, and both would raise the
tax rate on equity income. These changes should raise equity values by about 3
percent. The 50 percent dividend exclusion of The Treasury plan would raise
share values by another 14 percent, but most of this gain would be offset by
the only partial deductibility of interest expense (the real component). With
allowance for possible changes in interest rates and rental prices (NOIs) ,our
best estimates are that the Treasury plan would raise share values by 25
percent and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 would raise them by about 10 percent.
While the latter percentage move is not large in a historic perspective, and
thus could be swamped by other events, a 10 percent windfall is hardly trivial.
In both cases, the rise in stock prices follows from the heavier taxation of
new capital and the resulting rise in returns on existing capital.—13--
FOOTNOTES
Auerbachand Kotlikoff (1983) deduce that stock prices should have declined
in response to the shortening tax depreciation lives in ERTA becausenew
capital was favored over old. Downs and Tehranian (1986) report evidence in
support of this conclusion.
2
A capital stock's replacement cost is the amount it would cost toreplace all
existing capital with new capital, leaving the current productive capacity
unchanged. The stock's fundamental value is the present value of its expected
cashflows. The two are the same when the duration of the cashflow stream from
new capital equals the duration of the cashflow stream from vintage assets
(Downs, 1986).
If firms keep old capital on the old depreciation schedules, thechange in
value due to the tax depreciation change is (assuming a constant r)
= (l+r) (l—t)Kc3. jt 5 S
Using equations 5—7 with L approaching infinity, this reduces to
=—
With a single capital type, the change in valueper dollar of capital is simply
tZ, Auerbach and Kotlikoff's (1983) equation 4.12.—14—
We are grateful to Kenneth Rogers and John Musgrave at the Bureau of Economic
Analysis for discussions on the construction of capital stock estimates and for
supplying unpublished investment data. In our estimates, the depreciation
rates for plant and equipment (6) are 0.04 and 0.15, respectively. Our
estimate of K, the replacement cost of nonfinancial corporate plant and
equipment at year—end 1984, is $2145 billion and is virtually identical to the
BEA estimate of $2142 billion.
Our rental prices are from Hendershott (1986) .Theplant rental price is a
weighted average of those computed for 10—year utility structures, 15—year
utility structures, and industrial structures, the weights being 0.15, 0.30,
and 0.55, respectively. These weights are also used to construct the ACRS tax
depreciation schedules for plant investments after 1980.
6Our simulation computes the impact on share prices as if the pre—reform tax
regime had been expected to persist indefinitely into the future and the post—
reform tax parameters are now expected forever. Our results would be dampened
to the extent that investors either anticipated the trend that tax reform has
taken or expect the eventual reversal of some of the reform features (Auerbach
and Hines, 1986)
The impacts on capital of changes in tax policy when adjustment costs exist
has been modeled by Summers (1981) and Auerbach and Hines (1986). The primary
effect of adjustment costs is that policy changes move rental prices gradually,
rather than instantaneously, to the new steady state. Thus the stock market
change with these costs would lie between those with no change in rental prices
and with an immediate change.—15—
8
The level of interest rates has been found to respond to both businesstax
changes that alter investment demand [Feldstein and Sumners (1978)) and
personal tax changes that shift personal saving [Peek and Wilcox (1984) J. For
a general analysis of the impact of tax reform proposals on financialmarkets,
see Hendershott (1985).—16—
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total sum . $6382
discounted sum
@15.42% . $1891
TABLE 1: Intertemporal streams expected from nonfinancial corporate
































$752Profits tax rate (r)










new T Tel 0.1542 0.1881 0.1683
















Equipment rental price, c(.),
new T Te
new Ti Tel Y' 13' V, Z
new Ti Tel 'vi jj, v, Z, I
Plant rental price, c(.), reflecting:
new Ti Te 0.1510
new Ti Tel 7, ,v,Z 0.1510
new 1. Tel 7, 13 v, Z, 10.1510
Source: All data for current law and the Treasury Proposal are based on
Hendershott (1986); the same methodology was employed to compute data for
the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
aAssumes a 5 percent inflation rate.
TABLE 2: Parameters under alternative tax regimes.—19—
Treasury Tax Reform Act
row proposal of1986
pre-reform value $1119 $1119
constant rental prices and taxable interest rates but:
1 new TiTe 1162 (3%) 1169 (3%)
2 new TiTel 7 1391 (17%)
3 new TiTel 7, 1241 (7%)
variable rental prices, constant taxable interest rates, and:
4 new TiTel C(r,r) $1185 (4%) $1178 (4%)
5 new TiTel , j3i
and C(TIT,7,13,VIZ) 1617 (30%) 1337 (13%)
variable corporate investment, constant aggregate investment:
6 rental prices constant but
new Ti Tel 7, /3, 1 $1490 (23%) $1279 (10%)
7 rental prices fully adjust to
new Ti Tel 7, /3i 1 v1 Z 1552 (26%) 1319 (12%)
TABLE 3: Fundamental value under alternative tax regimes. The percentage
in parentheses is the change in fundamental value relative to thepre-
reform equity market value of $1637 billion.